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INTRODUCTION
Suppose as you near retirement, you would like to make short term
investments. After consulting with your financial advisor, you decide to
invest $10,000 in a promissory note from X Corporation. Over the course
of twenty months the interest rate on this investment fluctuates between
6% and 8%. During this time, you decide to invest another $10,000 with
a variable interest rate that fluctuates between 6% and 7.5%. When both
of your investments finally mature, you accept payment and do not enter
into any other transactions. Your $20,000 investment realized a total re-
turn of $22,200. While other investments could have yielded a better rate
of return, this investment, although relatively conservative, still earned
more than a traditional savings account.
Seven years later and five years into your retirement, you receive a
complaint in the mail that names you as the defendant in a lawsuit. The
complaint alleges fraudulent transfers and mentions recovery of invested
funds. You flip to the last page of the complaint and there are the figures
from the short-term investment made in X Corporation almost seven
years ago. The complaint states that X Corporation has filed for Chapter
* J. D. expected 5-12-02 Cornell Law School.
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11 bankruptcy and the U.S. trustee appointed to the bankruptcy is at-
tempting to recover a fraudulent transfer paid to you by the corporation.
The trustee alleges that the corporation was conducting a "Ponzi" or pyr-
amid scheme, which pervaded its entire business. Because of the fraudu-
lent activities, the investment payments made to you over seven years
ago must be returned to the trustee. You do not understand how fraud or
a pyramid scheme could have been involved. The rate of return was
lower than what other securities were paying. In addition to using a bro-
ker, the 6% to 8% annual interest rate you received was well within the
state's legal rate of 16%. Nearly seven years have passed since those
funds were paid to you. Now living on social security benefits and a
fixed income, there is no way that you can pay the trustee $2,200, let
alone hire an attorney to represent you in this lawsuit.
The situation described above happened to more than 10,000 indi-
vidual investors sued in the Bennett Funding Group, Inc. Chapter 11
Bankruptcy.' The Bennett Funding bankruptcy is one of the largest
bankruptcies involving a pyramid or "Ponzi scheme" in recent history.2
In a Ponzi scheme, an investment program is devised where "the returns
paid to investors are comprised of nothing more than the principal invest-
ments of other investors."'3 Eventually this investment scheme breaks
down leaving many investors, who expected profits, with a loss of princi-
pal. Once a Ponzi-style enterprise collapses and becomes a debtor under
the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee of the estate has the responsibility of
collecting whatever assets remain and paying investors and other credi-
tors of the estate.4 Often there are very few assets left in the estate as
many have been paid as returns to investors involved in the scheme. The
trustee appointed to a Ponzi scheme estate has the ability to bring a claim
against a former investor to recover the payments under the fraudulent
transfer and preference provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.5 In March
1998, the appointed trustee of Bennett Funding's bankruptcy filed over
10,000 lawsuits to recover $100 million in alleged fraudulent transfers.6
Three years later lawsuits were still pending against former investors. 7
I Charley Hannagan, Logjam of Lawsuits, No Bennett Refunds Two Years After Initial
Charges, Investors Still Wait For Justice, SYRACUSE HERALD AMERICAN, Mar. 29, 1998, at
El. 2 The term "Ponzi scheme" has been applied to a number of financial frauds that follow
a pattern similar to the famous swindle operating during the 1920s by Charles Ponzi. The
details are described in Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924).
3 Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and Preferential
Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157, 158 (Spring 1998).
4 Id. at 158.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 159.
7 See Order Granting Trustee's Motion for an Order (A) Authorizing the Consolidated
Estate to Enter Into Settlements of Fraudulent Conveyance/Transfer and Preference Claims
FAIR CONSIDERATION
While the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides for recovery of fraudu-
lent transfers under either a theory of constructive or actual fraud, a num-
ber of serious concerns arise when an investor, who acted in good faith
and without any knowledge of fraud, is sued for return of his or her
principal or interest paid or both. Although these lawsuits serve as a
means to redistribute assets to creditors, they have a punitive effect on
good faith investors. In many cases, by the time the trustee brings an
action, the investor has already spent his or her return from the invest-
ment since the actions are brought more than four years after the investor
received the return. Because of the fraudulent activity of the bankrupt
corporation, the good faith investor has to defend him or herself in court
and return these "payments" to the estate.
The Bennett investors, including a number of banks, invested in
Bennett Funding on the advice of brokers or financial advisors who were
unaware of a Ponzi scheme due to the low rate of return and Bennett's
profitable appearance. 8 Typically, a Ponzi scheme attracts its investors
by offering an exorbitant rate of return. 9 However, the Bennett investors
received a conservative rate of return that ranged from 8 % to 12 % per
annum. 10 At the time these lawsuits were filed in New York State, the
maximum rate of interest allowed by banking law was 16% per year. I I
Therefore, there was very little evidence to provide notice that Bennett
was conducting a Ponzi scheme. Most investors have long spent the re-
turns from the early 1990s on retirement expenses, college funds or other
daily living expenses.
Part I of this Note briefly examines the two theories of fraudulent
conveyance recovery available to a bankruptcy trustee. Part II provides
the historical background of the Bennett Funding litigation and the stale-
mate that ensued. Part III examines the trustee's expansive power to
with Certain Former Investor Defendants and (B) Establishing Time to Answer for Non-Ac-
cepting Former Investor Defendants, In re The Bennett Funding Group, Inc., No. 96-61376
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Order Granting Trustee's Motion].
8 See Breeden v. Thomas (In re The Bennett Funding Group, Inc.), No. 98-61376, 1999
Bankr. LEXIS 1843, at *18 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 1999); Breeden v. Gloucester Bank &
Trust Co. (In re The Bennett Funding Group, Inc.), No. 96-61376, slip op. at 6 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y Feb. 9, 1999).
9 See Sender v. Buchanan (In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs.), 84 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 1996)
(167% interest rate where legal interest rate was 8% per annum unless otherwise contracted);
DiCello v. Jenkins (In re Int'l Loan Network, Inc.), 160 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.C 1993) (625%
interest rate paid where legal interest rate was 24% per annum); Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep.
Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843 (D.Utah 1987) (100.8% APR interest rate where legal inter-
est rate was 10% per annum unless otherwise contracted).
10 See Statement Pursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056 and Local
Bankruptcy Rule 7056-1 (Of Material Facts As To Which the Official Early Investors Com-
mittee Contends) There Is No Genuine Issue To Be Tried, May 27, 1998, 14.
11 See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501 (McKinney 1999); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14-a
(McKinney 1999).
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recover fraudulent transfers through the development in two cases
brought under each theory of recovery. Finally, Part IV discusses the
unjust and punitive effects that the current fraudulent conveyance laws
can have on individuals involved in a Ponzi scheme bankruptcy. Part IV
also proposes a modification to the law to prevent such unfairness and
inequity in the future. This Note concludes that reform is necessary
under current debtor-creditor and bankruptcy laws in order to address
both the needs of creditors and good faith investors in a Ponzi scheme
bankruptcy.
I. THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY CODE AND THE UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT
The trustee has two theories of recovery that he or she may exercise
to recover funds from a Ponzi scheme investor: constructive fraud or
actual fraud. A Ponzi scheme investor receives two types of payment on
hir or her investment: (1) a return of principal investment, and (2) the
ficticious profits on those investments. 12 If the trustee pursues a con-
structive fraud theory, demonstrating that at the time of the transfer to the
investor the debtor lacked sufficient funds, the investor can retain any
repayment of principal. 13 However, if a trustee pursues an actual fraud
theory establishing proof of a Ponzi scheme, the estate may recover all
sums paid to an investor. 14
There are three sources that govern fraudulent transfer law: (1)
§ 54815 and § 54416 of the Bankruptcy Code (2) the Uniform Fraudulent
12 See McDermott, supra note 3, at 164.
13 See id. at 164-65.
14 See id. at 173.
15 Fraudulent transfers and obligations
(a)(1) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or
any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one
year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involun-
tarily-
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date
that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation; and
(c) Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voidable under this section
is voidable under section 544, 545, or 547 of this title, a transferee or obligee of such
a transfer or obligation that takes for value and in good faith has a lien on or may
retain any interest transferred or may enforce any obligation incurred, as the case
may be, to the extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in
exchange for such transfer or obligation.
11 U.S.C § 548 (1994).
16 Trustee as lien creditor and as successor to certain creditors and purchasers
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without
regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or
FAIR CONSIDERATION
Conveyance Act (UFCA) and (3) the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
(UFTA). 17 Today, almost every state has adopted either the UFCA or
the UFTA and there are very few differences between the two. 18 The
Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee to bring a claim under § 548 or
§ 544 and the appropriate state law, either the UFCA or UFTA.1 9 To
establish a constructive fraud claim, the trustee must first show that the
debtor had an interest in the property or funds transferred to the investor.
In addition the trustee must prove two additional elements:
(1) that the transfers were made for less than reasonably
equivalent value or fair consideration; and
(2) that the transfers left the debtor with insufficient
funds, under one of the three possible scenarios:
(a) the debtor was insolvent when the transfers were
made,
(b) the debtor was engaged in a business for which the
property retained after the transfers was an unreasonably
small capital, or
(c) the debtor intended or believed that it would incur
debts beyond its ability to pay as those debts matured.20
If a trustee pursues a claim under actual fraud against an investor,
he or she must prove that the debtor (1) had an interest in the funds
transferred, and (2) "that the transfer was made with actual intent to hin-
der, delay or defraud the debtor's creditors. '21 As noted above, under an
actual fraud theory, unless the investor can satisfy the requirements of a
good faith defense the trustee can recover all an investor's returns with-
out regard for whether these amounts are styled as fictitious profits or
repayment of principal. 22
In New York, which codified a version of the UFCA as NYD&CL
§§ 271-281, a trustee can proceed under either an actual or constructive
may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the
debtor that is voidable...
(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the trustee may avoid any transfer of
an interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is
voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allow-
able under section 502 of this title or that is not allowable only under section 502(e)
of this title.
11 U.S.C § 544 (1998).
17 See McDermott, supra note 3, at 159.
18 Id.
19 Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code specifically allows a trustee to take advantage
of state law: "[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property ...
that is voidable under applicable state law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim ... 11
U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (1998).
20 McDermott, supra note 3, at 160.
21 See id.
22 See id. at 160-61.
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fraud theory to recover fraudulent transfers pursuant to §§ 273-276.23
While the NYD&CL echoes most of the requirements listed above,
§ 276, which looks at the transferor's state of mind, requires that it work
in conjunction with NYD&CL § 278 to prevent recovery against a trans-
feree who lacked both knowledge of fraud and who provided "fair con-
sideration" in exchange for the transfer.24
NYD&CL § 278 provides for a "good faith" affirmative defense for
either a constructive or actual fraudulent conveyance claim. 25 However,
§ 278 splits the burden of proof between the plaintiff and the defendant.
Although the plaintiff must carry the burden of proving the defendant's
knowledge of fraud, the defendant must prove that there was fair consid-
eration present during the transaction. 26
II. BACKGROUND TO THE BENNETT FUNDING
GROUP LITIGATION
The Bennett Funding Group, Inc., located in Syracuse, New York,
was in the business of leasing office equipment and selling various inter-
ests in those leases to investors.2 7 By early 1996, Bennett had sold over
$2 billion in products to thousands of individuals and over 200 financial
institutions. 28 Later that same year the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission filed suit, alleging investment fraud. 29 Because of the suit, Ben-
nett and its subsidiaries filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on March 29,
1996.30 The bankruptcy court appointed Richard C. Breeden trustee. He
revealed that Bennett owed $215 million to financial institutions and at
least $674 million to 11,500 individual investors.3' Bennett used an ac-
23 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 276 (McKinney 1999) ("Every conveyance made and
every obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to
hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and
future creditors.").
24 1. Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, such creditor,
when his claim has matured, may, as against any person except a purchaser for fair
consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase, or one who
has derived title immediately or mediately from such a purchaser,
a. Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to the extent necessary
to satisfy his claim, or
b. Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution upon the property
conveyed.
2. A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent has given less than a fair
consideration for the conveyance or obligation, may retain the property or obligation
as security for repayment.
N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 278 (McKinney 1999).
25 Id.
26 Id.






count consisting of commingled proceeds from individual and institu-
tional investors to create the appearance of investment returns, resulting
in a collective debt of over $1 billion, most of which will never be recov-
ered by creditors.32
The trustee alleged that the investment scheme pervading The Ben-
nett Funding Group was a massive pyramid or "Ponzi scheme. ' 33 As
noted above, this scheme involves investors receiving profits from the
investment capital paid by newly attracted investors.34 Typically, the
debtor guarantees the investors large profits from their principal invest-
ments. To allow people at the top to receive a return requires that more
people join in the scheme. Eventually the scheme collapses, leaving
many investors without profits or repayment of their principal. In order
to recover these assets the trustee appointed to a Ponzi scheme estate
may bring a claim against those investors who received returns from
their investments. 35 The trustee can distribute the recovered funds to
other investors, creditors, and non-investor creditors of the estate.
In March 1998, Bennett's trustee commenced over 10,000 lawsuits,
3000 of which were against former investors, in an attempt to recover
over $100 million of allegedly fraudulent conveyances. 36 However,
since the commencement of these lawsuits very little has happened. Al-
most three years later, claims were still pending against former inves-
tors. 37 In November 1998, the trustee presented former investors with a
settlement offer.38 However, perhaps due to the unfavorable terms of the
settlement, 39 former investors did not accept it and the actions continued.
Many attorneys involved in this matter believe the lawsuits filed
against former investors were an attempt by the trustee to gain leverage
and obtain a large settlement with an insurance group that insured a num-
ber of investments made with Bennett. The Assicurazioni Generali Insur-
ance Company (hereinafter "Generali Insurance") provided insurance to
individual investors as well as financial institutions on their invest-
32 Id. at 157-58.
33 See Thomas, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1843, at *7.
34 See id. at *6 n.6.
35 McDermott, supra note 3, at 158.
36 See, e.g., Motion of Richard C. Breeden, as Trustee Pursuant to Federal Bankruptcy
Procedure 9019 for an Order Authorizing the Consolidated Estate to Enter into Settlements of
Fraudulent Conveyance/Transfer and Preference Claims with Certain Former Investor Defend-
ants, In re The Bennett Funding Group, Inc., No. 96-61376 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1998)
[hereinafter Trustee's Motion]. See generally McDermott, supra note 3, at 158-59.
37 See Order Granting Trustee's Motion, supra note 7, at 2.
38 Trustee's Motion, supra note 36.
39 See id. (requiring former investors to pay 30% of amount owed after reducing the total
amount by $1000); see Order Granting Trustee's Motion, supra note 7.
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ments. 40 Generali Insurance afforded the trustee the deep pockets that he
required to recover millions of dollars for the estate.
In April 1999, at the expense of the individual investors, the Trustee
and Generali Insurance reached a settlement agreement. 4' The terms of
the settlement provided that Generali Insurance would pay the estate
$125 million.42 It is estimated that the Generali Insurance settlement will
provide more money to the estate than will all the lawsuits filed against
former investors. While the trustee was quick to reach a settlement with
Generali Insurance, he took very little action to bring an end to the cases
pending against individual former investors. As of April 2002, cases are
still pending against former investors.
III. GLOUCESTER AND THOMAS
In order to evaluate the trustee's power to recover alleged fraudulent
transactions, it is helpful to examine the two categories of cases that were
part of the Bennett litigation. One category of lawsuits included claims
against banks and other financial institutions that loaned funds to Ben-
nett's leasing operation. The second type of lawsuits included those suits
against individual investors or "former investors" who invested in the
leases themselves. 43 In section A, the Gloucester case examines the trus-
tee's constructive fraud claim against a financial institution and section B
explores, through the Thomas case, an actual fraud claim brought against
a former investor. While both of these cases demonstrate the trustee's
expansive power in recovering fraudulent conveyances, they also illus-
trate the few options available to a defendant named in the Bennett
litigation.
A. BREEDEN V. GLOUCESTER BANK & TRUST CO.
Gloucester Bank & Trust Company (herinafter "Gloucester") alleg-
edly helped finance the Bennett leasing operation by providing loans to
them.44 Bennett did attempt to repay their loan obligation to Gloucester.
However, the trustee viewed the transfer of funds to Gloucester as a
fraudulent conveyance and therefore, recoverable. 45 The trustee filed a
complaint in the Federal Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
New York against Gloucester and other financial institutions under
§ 548(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), § 544(b) and §§ 271-281 of the New York
40 See Thomas, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1843, at *3 n.3.
41 See In re The Bennett Funding Group, Inc., No.96-61376, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1860
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1999).
42 See id. at *13.
43 See Gloucester Bank & Trust Co., No. 96-61376, slip op. at 21. (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Feb.
9, 1999).
44 Id. at 7.
45 Id. at 3.
FAIR CONSIDERATION
State Debtor and Creditor Law ("NYD&CL"). 46 In response to the
claim, Gloucester filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) in conjunction with Rule 7012(b) of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 47
On August 1, 1996, Gloucester filed a lawsuit against the Bennett
Estate asserting a secured interest in the loan transactions. 48 In mid-Au-
gust, Gloucester also sought to lift the automatic stay on certain lease
proceeds to which it claimed an interest and enjoin the trustee from dis-
posing of the proceeds.49 In his amended answer of September 25, 1996,
the trustee responded and asserted fifteen counterclaims against the
bank.50 In 1997 and early 1998, after a number of banks settled with the
trustee, he asserted new fraudulent transfer claims against Gloucester and
other banks that had commenced adversary proceedings against him.5'
One of the four causes of actions was to avoid all loan payments made by
Bennett to Gloucester within one year of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition as fraudulent transfers under § 548(a) of the Code.52 The other
relevant cause of action attempted to recover loan payments made within
six years of the petition under § 544(b) of the Code and the fraudulent
conveyance provision of NYD&CL §§ 271-281. 53 On April 9, 1998,
Gloucester moved to dismiss the trustee's complaint. 54
Eventually, the court granted Gloucester's motion to dismiss those
causes of action based on § 548.55 However, the court denied the motion
to dismiss the causes of action brought under § 544(b) and §§ 271-281 of
the NYD&CL.56 The New York State version of the UFCA provides the
trustee with four separate causes of action against constructively fraudu-
lent conveyances, each requiring the plaintiff to establish that the trans-
fers were made "without fair consideration. '57 Section 272 of the
NYD&CL defines what constitutes fair consideration:
Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation:
(1) When in exchange for such property, or obligation as
a fair equivalent therefor, and in good faith, property is
conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied or (2) When
such property, or obligation is received in good faith to
46 Id. at 8.
47 Id. at 3-4.
48 Id. at 6.
49 Id. at 6.
50 Id.




55 Id. at 21.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 19.
2002] 469
470 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 11:461
secure a present advance or antecedent debt in amount
not disproportionately small as compared with the value
of the property or obligation obtained. 58
The court in Gloucester, relying on prior case law, interpreted the
"good faith" component of § 272 to exist only when both the transferee
and the transferor acted in good faith.59
Although the trustee carries the burden of establishing lack of fair
consideration in a constructive fraud action brought under NYD&CL, the
trustee's burden is disjunctive. 60 Under this disjunctive burden the trustee
can successfully disprove fair consideration by establishing either a lack
of fair economic value or by proving a lack of good faith on the part of
transferor or transferee. 61 In the Gloucester case, as well as in a majority
of the former investor cases, the trustee did not claim that the bank had
acted in bad faith. 62 However, since Bennett had acted with subjective
bad faith throughout all of its transactions with Gloucester, the court con-
cluded that if the trustee could establish these facts at trial as a matter of
law the Gloucester and Bennett transactions could not have been made
for fair consideration under § 272 of the NYD&CL. 63
The constructive fraud cause of action, as with the actual fraud
claims, does contain an affirmative defense. NYD&CL § 278 provides a
two-prong test that splits the burden between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant.64 The plaintiff carries the burden of proof on the issue of the de-
fendant's knowledge of fraud. On the other hand, the defendant must
establish that there was fair consideration present during the transac-
tions. 65 The trustee in his complaint against Gloucester never alleged
actual or constructive knowledge of Bennett's fraud. 66 However, the
court held that Gloucester might not be able to prove fair consideration,
as defined under § 272 and therefore might not be protected by § 278.67
The court denied Gloucester's motion to dismiss the causes of action
alleging constructive fraudulent conveyances. 68
In the early part of 2000, Gloucester and a number of other banks
consolidated their claims and appealed this decision to the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel for the Second Circuit. The Appellate Panel narrowly
58 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 272 (McKinney 1999).
59 See Gloucester Bank & Trust Co., No. 96-61376, slip op. at 18.
60 Id. at 19.
61 Id.
62 See id. at 20.
63 Id. at 19-20.
64 Id. at 20.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 20.
67 Id.
68 See id. at 21.
FAIR CONSIDERATION
reversed the lower court ruling. The details and ramifications of this
appeal are discussed in section C.
B. BREEDEN V. THOMAS
In Thomas, an individual investor, in an effort to avoid litigation
moved to dismiss the causes of action filed against him by the trustee for
investments that he made a number of years earlier. 69 The decision in
Gloucester played a significant role in the success of Thomas and other
former investors. However, unlike Gloucester, the trustee proceeded
against Thomas and other former investors under a theory of actual
fraud. The trustee, while filing a constructive fraud claim against former
investors, has a better likelihood of success under actual fraud because, if
a Ponzi scheme exists, the transactions made to former investors were
intended to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. In addition, actual fraud,
if proven, may entitle the trustee to recover not only the fictitious profits,
but the principal invested as well.70
This hypothetical introduction is based, in part, upon Stephen
Thomas. He invested $20,000 in Bennett over a two year period, earning
upon maturity a return of about $2,200; the interest rate this investment
earned ranged from 6% to 8%. 7 1 The trustee, pursuant to §544(b) of the
Code, filed causes of action under §§ 271-281 of the NYD&CL. 72 While
the trustee did pursue a claim of constructive fraudulent conveyance
through §§ 273-275 of NYD&CL, it is less significant because of the
amount of funds invested and the nature of the investment. In Thomas,
the court dealt at length with the actual fraud claim brought under §276
of NYD&CL.73
NYD&CL §276 allows for recovery of transfers if they were made
with actual intent to "hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future
creditors. '74 Under § 276, the court may only examine the state of mind
of the transferor, not the actions or intent of the transferee. 75 The Bank-
ruptcy court determined that, in order to fully understand actual fraudu-
lent conveyances, § 276 must be read in conjunction with § 278.76
However, §278 provides that recovery may not be had against a trans-
feree who lacked knowledge of the fraud and who provided fair consid-
eration in exchange for the transfer. As noted above, fair consideration is
defined in terms of § 272, which the court interpreted in Gloucester to
69 See Thomas, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1843, at *24.
70 See McDermott, supra note 3, at 160-61.
71 Thomas, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1843, at *4.
72 Id. at *6.
73 See id. at *10-20.
74 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 276 (McKinney 1999).
75 See id.
76 See Thomas, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1843, at *11.
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require the good faith of both the transferor and the transferee. 77 Thus,
under this interpretation, the transfer from a bad faith transferor to an
unsuspecting good faith transferee will never be treated as a transfer
made with fair consideration. 78
This interpretation led the court to deny Thomas's motion to dismiss
because the trustee provided enough evidence to establish that a Ponzi
scheme did exist. 79 The court also denied Thomas's summary judgment
motion pursuant to the affirmative defense laid out in § 278; this defense
is only available to a transferee that provided "fair consideration" for the
transfers in the sense of § 272.80
This ruling leaves Thomas and other former investors with very lim-
ited options. Thomas, in order to establish that there was "fair considera-
tion" must go to trial and attempt to prove that a Ponzi scheme did not
exist. While this option may appear to be viable, it may prove futile for a
number of reasons.
First, to litigate the issue of whether a Ponzi scheme did exist will
be difficult given the substantial evidence that some type of illegal in-
vestment scheme was being conducted on behalf of Bennett. Second, to
litigate this issue and bring it to trial will undoubtedly cost thousands of
dollars. Thomas, like other former investors, is being sued for the return
of profits, which in this case constitute $2,200. From an economic stand-
point this option is clearly not logical. The court's ruling forces Thomas
to either litigate or pay the amount that the Trustee is attempting to re-
cover. Since the ruling, Thomas and other former investors have at-
tempted to reach some settlement agreement with the trustee. 81 In late
January 2001, the trustee proposed another settlement offer to former
investors. However, the settlement offer still requires former investors to
pay a significant percentage on their return or file an answer with the
court to avoid a default judgment.82
C. THE GLOUCESTER APPEAL AND THE NARROW RESULT IT BRINGS
TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
On May 25, 2000, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for
the Second Circuit ("BAP") narrowly reversed the Gloucester decision
77 See Gloucester Bank & Trust Co., No. 96-61376, slip op. at 19.
78 See Thomas, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1843, at *1 1-12.
79 See id. at *18.
80 id. at *20.
81 Interview with Laura Harris, Attorney for Stephen Thomas and other former investors,
in Syracuse, N.Y. (July 18, 2000).
82 See Trustee's Settlement Package Sent to Former Investor, February 2001, Thomas,
1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1843 (No. 98-61376) (requiring former investors to repay either 25% or
50% of amount owed after reducing the total amount by $1000) [hereinafter Trustee's Settle-
ment Package].
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as it applied to the constructive fraudulent conveyance causes of ac-
tions.83 Gloucester Bank, and a number of other banks consolidated their
claims and appealed the Gloucester decision. The issue presented on
appeal was whether the lower court properly interpreted the "good faith"
component in § 272 by allowing the trustee to successfully disprove fair
consideration by establishing a lack of good faith on behalf of the trans-
feree or the transferor. 84 The lower court had held that, under NYD&CL
§ 272, a lack of good faith could be proven if the transferor alone was
acting without good faith.85
The BAP believed that the lower court interpreted § 272 inconsis-
tently as it relates to constructive fraud. While the BAP acknowledged
that a number of states that have adopted the UFCA are split as to
whether the good faith of the transferor is needed to meet the good faith
component of fair consideration for constructive fraudulent convey-
ances, 86 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ("Sec-
ond Circuit") previously resolved this issue under NY State law. In HBE
Leasing Corp. v. Frank ("HBE 1") and later in HBE Leasing Corp. v.
Frank ("HBE 2"), the Second Circuit interpreted § 272 to require only
the good faith of the transferee in order to satisfy the good faith compo-
nent of fair consideration. 87 Therefore, the BAP concluded that for con-
structive fraud causes of action in the Second Circuit, only the good faith
of the transferee is needed. 88
On August 14, 2000, the court granted Gloucester's motion to dis-
miss the constructive fraudulent conveyance cause of actions filed
against them. 89 However, the Bankruptcy court reserved the decision
concerning motions to dismiss the fraudulent conveyances claims based
upon actual fraud under NYD&CL.90 For Gloucester and other financial
institutions, this was the end of a costly legal maneuver filed against
them over four years ago. The court will likely dismiss the actual fraud
causes of action because the transactions between Bennett and the banks
were for repayment on loans, not investments into the leasing scheme. 91
83 See Breeden v. Sprague Nat'l Bank (In re The Bennett Funding Group, Inc.), No. 96-
61376, slip op. at 4 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. May 25, 2000).
84 See id. at 3-4.
85 Id. at 4.
86 New Jersey, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire believe that only the transferee's
good faith is important, while Minnesota, Nebraska, Arizona, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania
consider the transferor's good faith. Id. at 13.
87 Id. at 7-8.
88 Id. at 14-15.
89 See generally Motion to Dismiss Trustee's Fraudulent Conveyance Claims Against the
Bank at 4, HSBC Bank USA v. Bennett Funding Group, Inc. (In re The Bennett Funding
Group, Inc.), No. 96-61376 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2000).
90 See id.
91 See Sprague Nat'l Bank, No. 96-61376, at 5.
20021
474 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 11:461
Therefore, it is hard to establish a theory of actual fraud. While the May
and August 2000 decisions resolved the confusion surrounding the inter-
pretation of § 272, as it pertains to constructive fraud cases, these deci-
sions do very little to end the lawsuits pending against former investors
brought under an actual fraud theory.
IV. MODIFICATION OF CURRENT DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAWS
A. SUMMARY
These two cases demonstrate the strong-arm power of the trustee
under § 544(b) and NYD&CL §§ 271-281 to recover transfers made.
Both of these cases turned on the interpretation of the good faith compo-
nent in § 272. The lower court's interpretation required both parties to
act with good faith in order to have fair consideration. The problem with
this interpretation is that it creates a situation where, if one party acts
with good faith and performs the requisite due diligence, the good faith
actor is at the mercy of the other party's bad intentions. Arizona, Minne-
sota, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, states that have also
adopted UFCA, still require consideration of the good faith of the trans-
feror.92 This standard places a tremendous burden on the good faith
transferee.
For example, suppose you went to lease a car at a local car dealer-
ship and paid the amount the dealer was asking. Unknown to you, the
dealer had already leased the car to another individual, but still leased it
to you. In a number of UFCA states and under the lower court's interpre-
tation of § 272, the lessee would be unable to claim that the deal was
made with fair consideration even though you paid fair market value for
the vehicle and did not know of the fraud.
In the Bennett Funding Litigation, the Financial Institutions and for-
mer investors performed the required investigation before making the
transactions. Nothing put bank officials, financial planners, stockbrokers
or individuals on notice of a Ponzi scheme. Therefore, the lower court's
opinion prevented either party from effectively using the affirmative de-
fense under § 278 because the transferor's bad faith prevented fair con-
sideration from being present in the transactions. While the BAP
decision does reverse the lower opinion as it applies to constructive
fraudulent conveyance, it still exposes Thomas and other former inves-
tors to further litigation over the "profit" or interest that was paid to
them. In order for former investors to protect the funds paid to them,
they would have to prove at trial that a Ponzi scheme did not pervade the
Bennett Funding Group.
92 Id. at 13.
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B. ADVOCATING REFORM TO OUR CURRENT DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAWS
The troubling aspect of the Bennett case is the impact that it had on
thousands of individuals, as well as financial planners, businesses, and
financial institutions. For most individuals the amount that the trustee
was attempting to recover ranged from a couple hundred to a few thou-
sand dollars. In an attempt to recover and distribute the assets of the
estate, the trustee brought thousands of lawsuits against innocent, unsus-
pecting individuals. While the trustee may recover fraudulent transac-
tions, there must be changes in the current Debtor-Creditor laws and
Bankruptcy laws to protect individuals who act in good faith. Although
the good faith defense is available in both a constructive and actual fraud
case, the investor, in limited circumstances, may be permitted to keep
funds that constitute repayment of principal, but must repay interest or
profits paid. The law needs to react differently in certain Ponzi scheme
bankruptcies.
The purpose of the fraudulent conveyance recovery laws is to re-
cover either property transferred to an individual in order to liquidate
one's assets before a bankruptcy or the return paid by the debtor to inves-
tors in a "too good to be true" profit scheme.93 In a typical Ponzi
scheme, where the rate of return on one's investment ranges between
150% and 400%, there is little doubt that fraudulent activity is known to
both parties involved. 94 Thus, our current debtor-creditor laws properly
address this situation by allowing for recovery of the fraudulent
transactions.
The law fails to act appropriately when an individual is part of a
Ponzi scheme that fails to alert investors to its existence. For example,
the Bennett scheme was not the typical "too good to be true" investment.
Even the trustee of the Bennett Estate did not allege that Thomas and
other former investors had acted in bad faith.95 However, the law still
affords the trustee a means to recover these transactions. 96 For many
investors, these transactions were made with Bennett four to eight years
before the lawsuits were filed against them in 1998. 97 Investors have
likely already spent what minimal returns they did realize on everyday
living expenses, retirement expenses or college funds.
93 See McDermott, supra note 3, at 186-88.
94 See id. at 178-81.
95 See Thomas, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1843, at *9 (Trustee did not dispute the fact that
Thomas acted in good faith).
96 See McDermott, supra note 3, at 188.
97 See Thomas, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1843, at *3 (investments began in February 1994
and suit brought in March 1998); Trustee's Settlement Package, supra note 82 (claiming re-
covery of portion of interest earned on all investments made during a six year period from
March 29, 1990 up to and including March 29, 1996). Taking into account the added two years
before suits were actually filed (March 1998) results in an eight year time period.
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Although these individual investors did nothing wrong under the
law, or in the view of the trustee, they were still the target of these law-
suits. Former investors, who acted in good faith, were and still are being
punished for the misconduct of Bennett Funding. These individuals,
many of whom are elderly, are forced to defend themselves in court to
prevent being ordered to pay the trustee "profits" of their conservative
investments that are no longer available.
As noted above, a majority of states have either adopted the UFCA
or UFTA, which provides the trustee of a bankruptcy estate with similar
powers to recover fraudulent transfers. The current laws potentially
force thousands of individuals who make good faith investments and per-
form due diligence to be defendants in a lawsuit if that company acted
with bad faith. The requirement that good faith be present on both sides
of the transaction creates a situation that would require a heightened or
super due diligence standard that is unreasonable in today's economy.
C. PROPOSED MODIFICATION TO THE CURRENT LAWS
The Bennett Funding litigation demonstrates the rigidity of current
debtor-creditor and bankruptcy laws. While the trustee and the courts
commended the defendants for their good faith, they still remain the tar-
get of pending litigation two years after their filing. Under current laws,
good faith investors in a Ponzi scheme are without recourse to have their
cases disposed of on the pleadings or through pretrial motions. Courts are
unwilling to decide as a matter of law that a Ponzi scheme exists. There-
fore, good faith investors must either engage in costly litigation or pay
the trustee the interest paid to them.
As previously discussed, a typical Ponzi scheme bankruptcy in-
volves an exorbitant rate of return that puts both parties on notice of the
illegal conduct.98 In these extreme cases the law properly reacts by al-
lowing the trustee to recover fraudulent transfers. However, in a situa-
tion like Bennett, where financial advisors, institutions, and individual
investors were unaware of the fraudulent activity of the debtor, an excep-
tion must be created for investors who act in good faith, perform the
required due diligence and receive a legal rate of return on their invest-
ments. These investors should be protected from the inequitable results
of current debtor-creditor laws.
One way to provide for this narrow exception is the creation of a
minimum rate of return in the court's definition of a Ponzi scheme. A
minimum rate of return standard would allow courts to decide on the
pleadings or through a pre-trial motion if a Ponzi scheme actually ex-
isted. In a fraudulent transfer case the issue would become whether fair
98 See supra Introduction.
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consideration or a reasonably equivalent value was paid for the transfer
of interest paid on a loan between the transferor and transferee. If fair
consideration is lacking, the trustee is entitled to recover the interest. In
a number of cases that have dealt specifically with the issue of fair con-
sideration, courts have concluded that interest paid within the maximum
legal rate of interest constitutes fair consideration.99 Thus, interest paid
to lenders in excess of principal was recoverable by the trustee if the
return exceeded the legal rate of interest. In the Bennett matter the rate
of interest paid to investors ranged from 7% to 12%, which was well
below the 16% maximum rate of interest allowed in New York state.
In the majority of Ponzi scheme cases, courts apply the same princi-
ples regarding fair consideration in allowing the trustee to recover fraud-
ulent transactions. 100 An exorbitant rate of return paid to investors is
lacking fair consideration and is recoverable by the trustee. When the
profits are "too good to be true," the courts prevent an investor from
retaining the funds. In typical Ponzi scheme cases, courts base their find-
ing of a fraudulent conveyance on the fact that the return paid to inves-
tors was well above the legal rate of return within that state.10, However,
in the Bennett case, the return paid to former investors was not above the
legal rate, but the result was the same. These former investors are the
subject of a lawsuit attempting to force them to return interest paid to
them that falls well within the legal rate of interest of New York state.
To eliminate such inequity, courts must establish a minimum rate of
return to fall within the definition of a Ponzi scheme. Such a minimum
rate of return standard might read:
A court may find a Ponzi Scheme exists when the rate of
return paid to a lender exceeds the legal rate of interest,
within the given state. The bankruptcy trustee may re-
cover these transactions because they were made without
fair consideration. If a transaction fell within the legal
rate of interest of the state, the court may presume that
the transferee acted with good faith provided the trans-
feree performed the required due diligence before invest-
ing. The trustee may rebut this presumption by a
showing of bad faith on behalf of the transferee. Absent
99 See, e.g., Menter v. Ames, 445 F.2d 1404, 1405 (2d Cir. 1971) (citing McNellis v.
Raymond, 329 F. Supp. 1038, 1046-47 (N.D.N.Y 1971)); Larrimer v. Feeney, 411 Pa. 604,
609 (1963) (payment in excess of legal rate not fair consideration).
100 See, e.g., Sender v. Buchanan (In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs.), 84 F.3d 1281, 1284-86
(10th Cir. 1996); DiCello v. Jenkins (In re Int'l Loan Network, Inc.), 160 B.R. 1, 23-62
(Bankr. D.C 1993); Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 855-77
(D.Utah 1987).
101 See, e.g., Buchanan, 84 F.3d. 1281; Jenkins, 160 B.R. 1; Abbott, 77 B.R. 845.
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such a showing, the court may grant defendant's motion
for summary judgement.
Such a proposed modification may prevent future injustice against good
faith investors.
A counter-argument to this proposal is that the Ponzi scheme's
fraudulent aspect is not the unrealistic profits paid to investors, but the
cycle of fraud that robs one victim to pay another. While the necessity of
redistribution of assets to other creditors in a bankruptcy is a valid argu-
ment, the current law has a punitive effect on good faith investors in a
Ponzi scheme. The current law punishes individuals that act in good
faith by forcing them to defend themselves in court at the expense of the
debtor's fraud. If a trustee can demonstrate that a Ponzi scheme existed,
there are few options available to defendants named in these recovery
actions. Even if the case does not go beyond granting a motion to dismiss
on jurisdictional grounds, good faith investors still must retain an attor-
ney to file a motion or answer to avoid having a default judgment filed
against them. The fraudulent conveyance laws impose legal expenses
upon an individual who is in the position least likely to bear such costs.
The current debtor-creditor laws further punish good faith investors
through the broad and expansive power of the trustee to bring claims
against these individuals after a significant lapse of time following a
transaction. In Bennett, the illegal investment scheme operated for more
than six years before discovery of its existence. It seems inequitable to
force individuals, who received interest payments three to six years prior
to the scheme's collapse, to repay this money when they had no reason to
suspect they invested in a Ponzi scheme. The state is in a better position
to absorb these losses than those individuals who were victims of the
transferor's fraudulent activities.
Another potential argument against a minimum rate of interest is
that it prevents the trustee from recovering all possible assets that are a
part of the bankruptcy estate, thereby limiting the amount of assets to be
redistributed to creditors. While the minimum rate of interest standard
would exclude investors who acted in good faith and received a rate of
return within the legal rate of interest within that state, there will still be
investors, however, who did not act with good faith or who received a
return above the legal rate. In addition, there may be more sophisticated
investors who did not perform the requisite due diligence. In Bennett, it
is estimated that the trustee's recovery efforts against former investors
will produce little to no recovery of assets for the estate. As previously
discussed, there is speculation that lawsuits filed against former inves-
tors, by the trustee, were an attempt to gain leverage to force a settlement
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with the insurance company. 02 The insurance company provided the
deep pockets for the estate in its recovery of assets. The trustee should be
precluded from recovering transfers paid to investors who received a le-
gal rate of interest and acted in good faith.
CONCLUSION
The creation of a minimum rate of return in a Ponzi scheme bank-
ruptcy would provide protection to those investors who act in good faith.
This minimum rate of return standard would allow those defendants, who
meet their burden of proof, to dispose of these lawsuits at the pleading
stage, thereby avoiding the costly dilemma in which many of the former
investors in Bennett Funding litigation find themselves today.
The Bennett Funding litigation provides a backdrop to fully ex-
amine the current state of debtor-creditor and bankruptcy laws. Bennett
reveals the punitive effects of current law on individuals who acted in
good faith and performed the requisite diligence, but still fail to recog-
nize the existence of a Ponzi scheme. The lack of a minimum return rate,
coupled with some states' requirement of good faith on behalf of both the
transferor and transferee, creates a situation where lenders will be forced
to commence arduous and costly investigations even when an investment
opportunity does not look too good to be true. It is time to reform cur-
rent debtor-creditor and bankruptcy laws to create a minimum return rate
standard that protects good faith investors from the strong-arm power of
the bankruptcy trustee.
102 See supra Part II.
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